Party
Discipline Diminishes Canadian Democracy
By David Kilgour and John Kirsner
Representative democracy in Canada is so dominated by political
parties that some experts believe the
party discipline exerted on most votes
in our House of Commons and provincial
legislatures is the tightest in the democratic
world.
Defenders of our model argue many
Canadians prefer it this way because every
candidate for each party can be assumed
at election time to have identical views
on every issue.
Others contend our executive democracy,
patterned on a system prevailing in Great
Britain about three centuries ago, requires
iron party discipline if our fused legislative
and executive branches of government are
to function effectively.
Another reason, probably the most
important, is that our practice makes
life easier for leaders of both government
and opposition parties.
Unlike parliamentary systems in places such as Australia,
virtually every vote in Canadian legislatures
is considered potentially one of non-confidence
in a government.
Even a frivolous opposition motion
to adjourn for the day can be deemed by
a cabinet, if lost, to have been one of
non-confidence.
The whips of government parties
have for decades used the possibility
of an early election to push their members
into voting the respective party line.
The opposition attitude is so similar
that we have the recent spectacle of both
opposition parties in our House of Commons
arguing that a free vote on an abortion
resolution would "rip out the heart"
of our parliamentary system of government.
The constituents of both provincial
and federal legislators would be the real
winners if party discipline is loosened.
Private members from both government
and opposition benches could then take
positions on government bills and other
matters based on pleasing constituents
instead of their respective party hierarchies.
A key recommendation of the all-party McGrath report on
House of Commons reform favoured more free
votes by calling for the inclusion in any
opposition motion intended to bring down
a government an explicit provision that
its passage would constitute a vote of non-confidence.
Another solution to excessive party
discipline is the "positive non-confidence
rule" used in the West German Bundestag.
It prescribes that an administration
is only defeated if a successful opposition
non-confidence motion also names a new chancellor.
In the case of the defeat of the
minority Clark government in 1979 on its
budget, for example, the West German rule
would have left Clark in office unless the
Liberals, New Democrats and Social Credit
MP's had agreed simultaneously on a new
prime minister who could hold the confidence
of a majority of MP's.
A study of the Thirty-Second Assembly of Ontario (1981-1985)
indicated legislators voted in uniform party
blocs about 95 percent of the time. The same basic pattern applies in the present and at least
the previous two House of Commons elected
in Ottawa. This record suggests the various party leaders could cast a
proxy on behalf of all their followers without
bothering to have them physically present
for votes.
It also overlooks that a majority
or even minority government can function
effectively without stratospheric levels
of party solidarity.
In the American Congress, where admittedly there is a strict
separation of powers between the executive
and legislative branches of government,
legislation does get passed with far less
party loyalty.
So different are the practices in
our two countries that The Congressional
Quarterly defines party unity votes
as ones in which at least 51 percent of
members of one party vote against 51 percent
of the other party.
Under this definition, itself astonishing
to Canadian legislators, the Quarterly
notes that for the years 1975-1982 party
unity votes occurred in only 44.2 percent
of 4,417 recorded Senate votes and in only
39.8 percent of ones in the House of Representatives.
This sample, moreover, includes the
years 1976-1980 when the Democrats
controlled The White House and both branches
of Congress.
A consequence of the American practice of voting one's
constituents' presumed interests first is
the longtime legislative coalition of Southern
Democrats and Republicans.
During 1981-82, the height of the "boll-weevil"
era, the group was successful more than
85% of the time because a majority of American
legislators from both parties shared a number
of areas of agreement.
Whether one agreed with them or not
is irrelevant; the point is that Canadian
bloc voting makes bi or tri-partisan agreement
on anything in our legislatures exceedingly
rare.
If party discipline in Canada is relaxed, it would be easier
for, say, Atlantic MP's to defy their three
party establishments, if need be, in support
of maritime issues.
Coalitions composed of members from
all parties could exist for the purpose
of working together on matters of common
regional or other concern.
The adversarial attitudes and structures
now entrenched in Parliament and our legislatures
by which opposition parties oppose virtually
anything a government proposes might well
change in the direction of all parties working
together in the national interest.
Following redistribution this summer, each Member of Parliament
will represent on average of about 87,000
voters.
At present, few government and opposition
MP's have any real opportunity to put their
constituents' first in votes in the House
of Commons. Real power is concentrated in the hands of the three party
leaderships.
Canadian democracy itself would benefit
substantially if we put our present mind-numbing
party discipline where it belongs, in the
history books.
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