In
Search of Good Governance
Notes for remarks by
David Kilgour, P.C., M.P.,
Edmonton Southeast
to the 1999 Laurentian Seminar
on Parliament and the Challenge
of Good Governance
Sedbergh School, Montebello, Québec, July 20-30, 1997
It is an honour to participate
in this conference with
such distinguished M.P.s,
etc. from 14 countries on
virtually every continent.
Robert Miller, the organizer
of this seminar, commented
in a 1985 essay on the fate
of legislatures in many
developing countries:
"In many developing
countries they [
the legislatures]
have become marginal institutions.
In the competition for
power they have fared
poorly against the charisma
of leaders, the expertise
of bureaucrats and the
guns of the military.
It is part of the ritual
of coups to shut them
down. In those cases where
legislatures have not
been dismissed by military
governments, they have
often been turned into
adjuncts of executive-centered
states.
"And yet they persist.
No matter how marginalized,
legislatures continue
to function. No matter
how often dismissed they
reappear and, stranger
still, are summoned to
reappear by those who
have dismissed them. Legislatures
have certain vague attributes
that cause one to say:
‘If they didn’t
exist, they would have
to be invented.’
What is the source of
their staying power?"
Parliamentary
Development
As you know, the Parliamentary
Centre, now headed by Miller,
is identifying strategies
for parliamentary development
which is seen all over the
world as a vital part of
the governance agenda. "Parliaments
are particularly important
in helping to ensure open,
accountable government,
as well as effective oversight
of the executive. Moreover,
they can serve as one of
the vital bridges linking
civil society and the state,
thus helping to ensure that
democratic institutions
are solidly grounded in
democratic cultures,"
he wrote in the Centre’s Proposal to the Economic
Development Institute of
the World Bank.
Losing Faith in
Parliament
Recent years have witnessed
a worldwide fall in respect
for parliaments, parliamentarians
and the political process
itself. An October 1994
Gallup poll indicated that
64% of the British public
believed that Members of
Parliament were in Parliament
for private gain. A number
of publicized cases in the
United Kingdom have given
rise to concerns about the
decline in public standards:
for example, in 1994, two
M.P.s were identified as
being open to accepting
an outside payment for asking
a parliamentary question;
in another case, allegations
were that a junior minister’s
stay at the Ritz Hotel in
Paris had been paid for
him; a number of ex-ministers
and senior public servants
were seen by the public
as having moved too quickly
after retiring to appointments
connected to their previous
official duties.
In addition to the growing
concerns and increasing
public cynicism about standards
in political life, questions
about the relevance and
representativeness of parliamentarians
and parliament continue
to come up. Then British
Prime Minister, John Major,
responding to growing public
concern announced in October
1994 the establishment of
a committee (The Nolan Committee)
to examine the existing
situation regarding concerns
about the standards of conduct
of public office holders
and to recommend any changes
required to ensure the "highest
standards of propriety in
public life."
The report by Nicholas
Hopkinson, based on the
Wilton Park Special Conference,
February 1995, Parliament
and People: Making Democratic
Institutions More Representative,
Responsible and Relevant,
examines the issues raised
by the Nolan Committee whose
conclusions are seen to
be also of relevance outside
the U.K. The Nolan Committee
recommended seven principles
of public life: selflessness,
integrity, objectivity,
accountability, openness,
honesty and leadership.
In order to improve public
standards, these principles
should be incorporated by
all public bodies into codes
of conduct with internal
systems for maintaining
standards supported by independent
scrutiny.
Among its many conclusions,
the report stresses those
referring to the role of
Parliament: opening up Parliament
and the political process
is viewed as essential to
winning back the confidence
of the public. More public
participation in committees
is a major way to improve
the openness of government;
"sentiment in favour
of referenda, particularly
citizen-initiated referenda,
is growing" points
out the report, "although
many still believe that
they undermine parliamentary
democracy." For Parliaments
to be relevant, Parliaments
must also be representative
of those they serve.
The report stresses that
issues of accountability,
responsiveness, new public
management and reinventing
government are issues for
every country to determine:
"only the solutions
vary between different political
systems; each country evolves
its own democratic methods
of governance based on its
own culture, social traditions
and levels of development."
Principles of
Good Governance
Searching for Good Governance,
the 1994 final report of
the Government and Competitiveness
Project makes a significant
contribution to the current
debate, not only in Canada,
on efficiency in the public
sector. The authors of the
report, Bryne Purchase and
Ronald Hirschhorn, say that
its central purpose was
the consideration of techniques
for improving the efficiency
and effectiveness of government
programming and government
organizations: "The
basic premise is that large
gains in the efficiency
and effectiveness of government
are achievable simply by
changing the incentive structures
and other mechanisms to
ensure accountability that
confront key decisionmakers
- whether politicians, providers
of public services, or clients
of those services,"
says the report.
On the premise that governance
matters to competitiveness
in the public sector as
in the private sector, the
report identifies eight
basic principles for the
design of good governance
that should form the basis
for making necessary institutional
changes. These principles
are as follows: focus on
outputs, make decisions
transparent, provide incentives,
establish constraints, promote
competition, link costs
and benefits, encourage
commitment and loyalty,
maintain trust through fairness.
Democratizing
Canada’s Democracy
In Canada, the public view
of our national politicians
has most unfortunately continued
to deteriorate in recent
years. In 1979, for example,
only 15% of Canadians said
they felt "very little"
respect for the House of
Commons; by 1993 this had
reached 33%. Polls also
track the lack of trust
in political parties shared
by many Canadians. In 1979,
22% of Canadians did not
trust political parties;
this was 30% in 1985; 49%,
in 1993. One reason for
the rise of public cynicism
is presumably the perceived
unresponsiveness of our
national institutions in
the view of most Canadians.
For example, my own door-to-door
meetings with numerous constituents
indicate that many have
little confidence in the
capacity of federal legislators
to represent constituents
on a host of issues.
Reforming the role of M.P.s
is vital to "nationalizing
Ottawa" because of
the widespread public impression,
that M.P.s are brute voting
machines for their respective
party whips. Experts say
Canadian legislators (federal
and provincial) face the
tightest party discipline
in the democratic world.
Since I was elected in 1979,
the members of the various
parties have voted as uniform
blocs in virtually every
single House of Commons
vote.
Private members will probably
only become significant
in policy-making when our
voting practices change.
The 36th Parliament with
its unprecedented composition
of five parties can succeed
in improving the occupational
credibility of all M.P.s.
Unlike parliamentary systems
in places such as Great
Britain, virtually every
vote in Canadian legislatures
is potentially one of non-confidence
in the government. The constituents
of both provincial and federal
legislators would be the
real winners if party discipline
were loosened. Private members
from both government and
opposition benches could
then take positions on government
bills and other matters
based on assisting constituents
instead of respective party
hierarchies.
If party discipline in
Canada were relaxed, representation
for all areas of Canada
would be improved. Coalitions
composed of members of all
parties could exist for
the purpose of working together
on issues of common regional
or other concern. The present
adversarial attitudes and
structures in which opposition
parties usually oppose virtually
anything a government proposes
might well change in the
direction of parties working
together for the common
good.
Our all-party McGrath report
on parliamentary reform
in 1985 came to the conclusion
that the role of the individual
member must be enhanced.
As James McGrath himself
said, "I wanted to
put into place a system
where being a member of
Parliament would be seen
to be an end to itself and
not a means to an end".
One way to reduce party
discipline in the interest
of greater fairness for
every province would be
to write into our constitution,
as the West Germans did
in their Basic Law, or our
House Rules, that M.P.s
and Senators shall "not
(be) bound by orders and
instructions and shall be
subject only to their conscience".
Another approach would be
for each new federal or
provincial government to
specify at the start of
their mandate which matters
at the heart of their program
will be deemed confidence
issues. In those situations,
party discipline would be
fully justifiable.
The Chrétien government's
commitment to reforming
Parliament resulted in a
marginally enhanced role
for private M.P.s in their
duties as public policy
makers. Reforms in the last
Parliament made it more
responsive to Canadians
and the work of individual
M.P.s more relevant. Governments,
we are told, will be more
accountable to the House
of Commons and, through
it, to Canadians. The initiatives
to revise parliamentary
rules announced in the House
of Commons in the last Parliament
should give M.P.s greater
power to amend government
bills and initiate legislation,
and strengthen the role
of M.P.s in developing the
spending priorities of government.
The three main parties have
also agreed to ask the Commons
procedures committee to
study further reforms, including
free votes, electronic voting
and the idea of giving constituents
the right to recall their M.P.s.
Many new M.P.s in the 36th
Parliament will probably
seek further changes in
the way private members’
bills are dealt with and
debated in the House. Though
reforms introduced to date
in private members’
business gave M.P.s an increased
role in the legislative
process, more is seen to
be needed to allow more M.P. participation in what
is now the exclusive territory
of the cabinet and government.
An article by Iain Wilson,
"Making a Difference:
Private Members’ Bills
and Public Policy"
cites the dismal Canadian
success rate of private
bills in becoming the law:
of the almost 3,000 private
members’ bills introduced
between 1968 and 1987, only
twelve were enacted. Elsewhere
in the world, the record
is comparable. In New Zealand
says Wilson, no private
members’ bill has been
passed in the last 40 years
(as of the late 1980s).
In Australia, 51 private
members’ bills have
passed in the last 76 years.
In contrast, Wilson points
out, "of 100 or so
private members’ bills
that have been introduced
in the British Parliament
every year since 1980, an
average 13 a year have been
passed."
Such proposals as improved
prospects for private members’
bills should be the beginning
of a process many Canadians
seek so that the present
widespread public opinion
for one key national institution
might become a thing of
the past. Only, however,
when the words of the 18th-century
political philosopher Edmund
Burke define the standards
of our elected representatives
will we be able to say we
have helped diminish the
cynicism towards our public
figures: "It is his
duty to sacrifice his repose,
his pleasures, his satisfactions,
to constituents; and above
all, ever, and in all cases,
to prefer their interest
to his own."
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