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Chapter 1- THE STAGE AND
THE PLAYERS
A
decade ago, a young, handsome
and skilled man on the run
from the communist regime
in Poland resolved to settle
in Canada. The word itself
was a synonym across Eastern
Europe for a land of milk
and honey. Many saw it as
all but full of gold-paved
streets. His past was the
bargaining chip he was going
to use to buy a trouble-free
entry to Canada. As a KGB-trained
Polish intelligence agent,
he was certain his security
skills would be useful to
Canadians and he was eager
to prove it. Today, he can
hardly call Canada home
when our national government
continues to do its best
to deport him and erase
him from the collective
memory of numerous RCMP,
Immigration Department and
security officials.
This
book attempts to recreate
Ryszard Paszkowski's colourful
life as an intelligence
agent in Communist Poland
and to trace his footsteps
to Canada. Initially, his
skills were in considerable
demand in Ottawa circles.
We'll relive his numerous
battles with the Canadian
immigration system. Thousands
of pages of documents on
him have accumulated in
federal government departments,
including the Justice Department,
Solicitor General's Office,
RCMP and Canadian Security
Intelligence Service headquarters,
External Affairs (now Foreign
Affairs) and a host of Canadian
consulates and embassies
abroad. Many of them remain
"top secret" and one can
only guess at their contents.
A small fraction of them
were made available to me
through Access to Information
requests. Many of the thick
piles of photocopies that
arrived as replies contained
blank or whited-out pages
with one or two denatured
sentences on them. Instead
of internal documents, there
would often be endless photocopies
of newspaper articles about
Paszkowski, which are available
to anyone and need not be
obtained through the complicated
and lengthy process of an
Access to Information request.
Our legendary RCMP turned
out to be the most secretive
organization of all. It
wouldn't even admit they
had a single file on him:
"No personal information
concerning Mr. Ryszard Paszkowski
also known as Robert Fisher
and/or Edward Busch born
March 4, 1955 was found."
It
appears that it is still
in someone's notion of the
national interest to protect
the often anonymous officials
who insist Ryszard Paszkowski
remains persona-non-grata
in Canada. In the age of
a vanished Cold War, our
security mandarins cling
to their secrets and intrigues.
The "Great Game", as the
former East-West rivalry
was known among our spy
fraternity, might be over,
but the music plays on for
some.
As
the Member of Parliament
for Edmonton Southeast,
I was approached about five
years ago by a highly-respected
constituent of Polish origin
to help Ryszard Paszkowski
with the many hurdles being
imposed by Canadian Immigration
officials. His training
and life as an agent fascinated
me. As a former federal
Justice Department lawyer,
I found his immigration
battles and wooden government
responses to his "spying
for Canada" revelations
most troubling. Having since
pleaded his case with various
cabinet ministers in the
Mulroney government and
government departments,
I presumed he would eventually
be allowed to stay if only
on humanitarian and compassionate
grounds.
Watching
Ottawa officialdom's unceasing
efforts to deport Paszkowski
and probably thereby to
separate him from his wife
and two sons, often with
underhanded tricks, convinced
me the case was not being
heard on its merits, but
was being determined mainly
by bureaucrats who were
not entering the process
officially. This will not
soon be provable because
of secrecy imposed from
various quarters. In this
account of the case, I was
initially tempted to recreate
in docu-drama style some
of the missing pieces of
the puzzle to try to explain
the federal government's
bizarre behaviour. However,
as often happens, reality
appeared more improbable
than fiction. That's partly
why I decided to unfold
`the Paszkowski file' as
it was known to me unvarnished.
It is based mostly on Paszkowski's
own detailed account of
his life, having his full
co-operation as far as any
former spy can tell the
whole truth. I have attempted
to capture the `living dangerously'
episodes of a now-dying
breed of highly-trained
spies. We follow Paszkowski's
five-year long effort to
stay in Canada despite a
mammoth bureaucracy, which
seemed to be pitted firmly
against him, using both
his own story and Access
to Information documents.
Ryszard
Paszkowski's account of
his life provided the main
material for this book.
For the most part, it is
based on his hand-written
notes sent to me during
his three-month stay in
Europe during the spring
and summer of 1992.
All
quoted official documents
have been obtained through
Access to Information Act
requests to federal government
departments. Paszkowski's
own descriptions of events,
his feelings and thoughts
occur frequently. These
interludes are intended
to help the reader see the
events through the prism
of Paszkowski's - the perspective
of an individual who lived
through some very bizarre
incidents.
This
account is not an attempt
to glorify Ryszard Paszkowski's
life, or to provide excuses
for his various misdeeds.
He was and is an ordinary
person who, because of decisions
made early in life, became
involved in events often
beyond his control. One
can find considerable fault
with how he reacted to events,
but it is difficult not
to empathize with him in
his fight to carve a place
for himself in a world of
fast-changing political
priorities by governments
and their intelligence agencies.
Some readers might believe
neither Paszkowski's story
nor Canadian officialdom's
viewpoints. We will not
be likely to learn the truth
for at least a quarter century
as the government insists
our national security is
still at stake. When secret
files are finally opened
decades from now, the account
here will, I believe, prove
to be essentially correct.
The
book is clearly more sympathetic
to Ryszard Paszkowski than
to many government departments
and law enforcement agencies.
It is not, however, seeking
to build a defense case
for the former spy. In the
spy world, one never knows
who is really telling the
truth. Often objective realities
simply don't matter in the
world of international espionage
where schemes, intrigues
and plotting are full of
illusion, political paranoia
and the prejudices of bosses
high in the various intelligence
hierarchies. Hundreds of
thousands of dollars of
ever scarcer taxpayer money
has been spent by CSIS since
1984 when Paszkowski came
to Canada to do intelligence
work. When something went
awry, even more public money
was used to muster a case
against him, using government
time, expensive litigation,
experts and officials. As
we shall see, he is a stubborn
and in many ways admirable
person, who now seeks only
to live a normal life in
Canada with his young family.
*
* * * *
First
a word about some other
key players.
Canadian
Security Intelligence Service
(CSIS)
In
mid-1984, most of the Canadian
Security Intelligence Service
Act was proclaimed in force:
the new civilian service
replaced the Security Service
part of the RCMP, which
had been seriously discredited
for past illegal activities,
including barn burning in
Québec during the 1970s.
The CSIS Act made Canada
one of few Western democracies
to give its security service
an explicit statutory charter.
In many ways, it constituted
an attempt to bring the
security intelligence function
under democratic control.
Criticism
of CSIS began almost immediately
after its birth. Some said
it was dead wrong to remove
the security intelligence
function from the RCMP;
that the loss of investigative
experience and the discipline
of law enforcement combined
with the public respect
afforded to the RCMP would
mean that the new agency
couldn't do the job as well
as the Mounties. There has
also been criticism of the
mandate given to the agency
on the basis that it goes
well beyond what is needed
to protect Canada's security.
Many have been critical
of the new investigative
powers - such as mail opening
and surreptitious entry
- that had been legally
unavailable to the RCMP
Security Service and of
the weak control and review
mechanisms.
The
service started with 1,964
employees and a budget of
$16 million. Nine years
later, there were 2,465
people officially working
for the agency and its 1993-1994
budget was $229 million.
The
many problems the fledgling
service faces have been
well-documented over the
years, including Richard
Cleroux's 1990 book, Official
Secrets. Cleroux devoted
a chapter to Paszkowski's
case and made the first
real attempt, following
many earlier newspaper articles
to connect all the strands
in a complex story and to
pinpoint CSIS' role in it.
Cleroux notes that admitting
to recruiting Paszkowski/Fisher
in Italy would be in direct
conflict with the CSIS Act,
which expressly forbids
CSIS from operating covertly
abroad. It was the RCMP
who cleared Paszkowski to
come to Canada and CSIS
made its first contact with
him in Canada. After the
whole affair was made public,
this sequence allowed CSIS
to deny it had recruited
Paszkowski, "which was strictly
speaking true," says Cleroux.
"The Mounties had sent him
over."
Security
Intelligence Review Committee
(SIRC)
The
SIRC is in its own words
"Parliament's and the public's
eye" on CSIS. It is composed
of five part-time members
appointed by the Governor
in Council after consultation
between the Prime Minister
and the leaders of parties
recognized in the House
of Commons. According to
its mandate defined in the
CSIS Act, the SIRC's role
is to monitor CSIS' effectiveness
while making sure that the
service does not make "unreasonable
or unnecessary" use of its
powers. The SIRC also investigates
complaints against CSIS
and ones about the denial
of security clearances in
public service employment,
federal contracts, immigration
and citizenship. The SIRC
reports on its work once
a year in an Annual Report,
which is public. As national
security limits are imposed
on the report, its generalities
do not appear to reflect
accurately the controversies
hidden behind the polished
style of the report.
The
1987-1988 Annual Report
of the SIRC admits that
the year had been a difficult
time for CSIS: "It was a
year in which CSIS faced
perhaps its darkest moments."
The resignation of its first
Director after the Atwal
warrant affair, the failure
to inform the police in
advance of the conspiracy
to murder a minister of
the state government of
Punjab in India, controversy
surrounding the entry into
Canada of terrorist Mahmoud
Mohammad Issa Mohammad,
and reports that CSIS had
information that might have
prevented the Air India
tragedy of June 23, 1985
all surfaced that year.
These as well as other reports
of bungling and wrongdoing
did not endear the Canadian
public to the Service.
The
Paszkowski affair was the
last thing the Service needed
during its most troubled
year. The SIRC Annual Report
contains this sterile statement
on Paszkowski's case: "In
another matter that came
to public attention during
the year, we satisfied ourselves
that CSIS dealt properly
with Ryszard Paszkowski,
who went to the media in
January, 1988 with a complex
account of how his work
for CSIS let him in for
a year in a West German
jail to complete a hijacking
sentence. As the Solicitor
General has confirmed in
the House of Commons, Paszkowski
did work for CSIS after
entering Canada illegally,
but CSIS did not bring him
into the country to be a
double agent, as he claims,
and it ended the relationship
before Paszkowski voluntarily
left Canada in August, 1986,
and went to Italy, where
he was extradited by West
Germany."
A
more complete story of CSIS
blunders, even with some
national security limitations,
would not likely lead the
then SIRC Chair Ronald Atkey
to conclude that 1987/88
had "brought CSIS the chance
it needs to get a second
wind and complete its evolution
into the kind of agency
that Parliament intended
when it adopted the CSIS
Act in 1984 - a civilian
agency with contemporary
priorities, its attention
focused on gathering and
analysing security intelligence
as a basis for solid advice
to the government of the
day." In other words, the
SIRC indicated that CSIS
had had its dark moments
but had `turned the corner'
and the new director was
providing active leadership.
Although the SIRC had many
criticisms of CSIS, it expressed
its belief that the Service
was on the right road. Paszkowski's
case was considered a closed
matter which would not resurface
to haunt the Service. It
was not to be.
The
SB - Sluzba Bezpieczenstwa
The
Polish Ministry of the Interior
and the SB were for decades
synonymous in Poland with
state oppression, a machine
of terror turned on it's
own defenceless citizens.
There are still countless
untold stories of tortured
and murdered Polish patriots,
those illegally arrested,
persecuted and jailed for
the crime of free thinking,
those terrorized and blackmailed
into spying on their compatriots,
and those denied promotion
or position of status in
society for not toeing the
official party line. Almost
two generations of Polish
citizens lived with the
spectre of the SB, its countless
informers and wiretaps.
This is something Poland
on its way to democracy
still has to come to terms
with.
The
SB began after the Soviet-sponsored
communist government was
formed in Poland in mid-July,
1944. Its Ministry of Public
Security had eleven departments
which infiltrated political
parties, labour unions,
churches, and others. In
1954, a new Ministry of
the Interior and the Committee
for Public Security were
created. Two years later,
the Public Security body
was dissolved and all its
functions were eventually
taken on by the SB (Sluzba
Bezpieczenstwa) under the
control of the Ministry
of the Interior. This structure
survived for fully 34 years
until Solidarity took power
in 1989. The last communist
Minister of the Interior,
General Czeslaw Kiszczak,
became a member of the first
Solidarity cabinet.
Legislation
passed by the Polish Parliament
a year later dissolved the
SB and created in its place
the Office of State Protection.
Members of the former SB
were subjected to a clearance
process by which their previous
activities were scrutinized.
Among 25,000 SB members,
14,000 agreed to undergo
this examination. After
the process was completed,
some of them joined the
state police, which replaced
the militia. The Office
of State Protection hired
about 4,500 former SB staff.
The
third Prime Minister in
post-Communist Poland, Jan
Olszewski, questioned the
need for a ministry, which
he referred to as a direct
continuation of the notorious
Stalinist Ministry of Public
Security. There have since
been further attempts to
reform the ministry by removing
its control of the Office
of State Security and making
it directly responsible
to the Prime Minister. In
fact, the fall of subsequent
Solidarity-based governments
prevented proposals for
reforms from taking firm
shape. The election victory
in 1993 of a left-wing coalition
over the pro-Solidarity
and like-minded parties
indicates that coming to
terms fully with the infamous
past of the SB is unlikely
for the immediate future
at least.
In
mid-1990, the first non-Communist
Minister of the Interior,
Krzysztof Kozlowski, acknowledged
that there was an active
group of KGB agents in Poland.
Its chief, with a group
of other officers was accredited
with the Polish Ministry
of the Interior. Officially,
they had diplomatic status
as Soviet Embassy employees.
In an interview the same
year, the respected former
American intelligence expert,
John Barron, claimed that
Polish intelligence forces
were still very active on
behalf of the KGB at least
in the USA. Polish intelligence
still functioned as an auxiliary
of the KGB in America, he
continued, despite the political
changes in Poland. According
to Barron, Poles employed
in diplomatic posts worked
for the KGB. The same was
often true of those working
for the United Nations and
on scientific exchange programs
with the West. Reportedly,
they were sending reports
directly to Moscow, from
where they received their
orders, completely bypassing
Warsaw. As the world perceived
Poland as being a country
relatively independent of
the Soviet Union, agents
with Polish passports had
an easier task doing espionage
work. Richard Perle, Undersecretary
of Defence in the Reagan
administration, claimed
in the spring of 1990 that
many agents of Communist
intelligence forces co-operating
with the KGB remained in
America not because their
respective countries needed
them as agents, but mainly
because they were hard to
remove.
Polish
intelligence agents were
well-placed internationally
through embassies, consulates,
trade and cultural missions
sponsored by Poland. Interior
Minister Kozlowski revealed
in a 1990 interview that
the number of officers working
under cover abroad was in
the range of 18-20 per cent
of the diplomatic post staffs.
He wouldn't give the number
of spies in Polish diplomatic
postings and refused to
agree with one journalist's
calculations that since
Poland had roughly 100 diplomatic
establishments world-wide
that figure multiplied by
four would give an approximate
number of intelligence agents
operating abroad. Kozlowski
during the same interview
admitted that half of the
people in intelligence were
gone and there was a need
for "rebuilding".
East
German Stasi
Former
agents of East Germany's
secret police, Stasi, quickly
adjusted to a new political
situation after the fall
of the Berlin Wall. Approximately
2,600 former employees of
this much-hated East German
agency found jobs with a
number of federal departments
and ministries in Bonn according
to a 1993 report by the
German newspaper Bild.
The newspaper says 59 ex-Stasi
officers have highly-placed
positions and have access
to confidential national
files. Other former secret
agents found positions with
factories and companies
by using their connections
with former bureaucrats.
Bild reported some
former Stasi employees were
using their connections
to co-operate with Russian
organized crime and to make
money operating illegal
businesses.
The
Ottawa Citizen reported
in the summer of 1993 from
Berlin that according to
a leading government investigator,
Manfred Kittlaus, former
East German Stasi secret
police agents and former
officials had teamed up
with organized crime and
posed a threat to the united
country. Kittlaus, who directs
criminal investigations
related to the former Communist
government, said that the
East Germans had formed
alliances with criminal
groups from the former Soviet
Union and the West.
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