China Brief (03.09.2008) - While the catchwords and slogans of the
just-ended Beijing Olympics trumpeted "harmony" and "One World, One
Dream," the traditionally tense relations between Han Chinese and
ethnic minorities – particularly Uyghurs and Tibetans – could worsen
significantly in the foreseeable future. Four quasi-terrorist attacks
in the Xinjiang Autonomous Region (XAR) in August resulted in the
death of at least 22 People's Armed Police (PAP) officers and police.
This is despite the fact that since the riots that hit Tibet and four
neighboring provinces in March, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
administration has tightened security in the Xinjiang and Tibet
autonomous regions. President and Commander-in-chief Hu Jintao, the
only member of the Politburo Standing Committee with personal
experience in handling ethnic-minority disturbances, has so far said
nothing concerning the Xinjiang attacks. Yet indications are that
Beijing will amplify its two-pronged approach by employing even
tougher strategies to "nip troublemaking in the bud" while at the same
time earmarking more funds to win over the support particularly of
needy Uyghur and Tibetans.
Hardball tactics against underground separatist groups in Xinjiang
include cutting off their overseas supply lines, in addition to
intensifying what China critics call scorched-earth,
search-and-destroy operations. It is instructive that the first
foreign trip that Hu made after the Olympics included a visit to
neighboring Tajikistan, where he attended a summit of the heads of
state of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). From Beijing's
viewpoint, a key function of the SCO, which groups China, Russia,
Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, is to ensure that
backers of Uyghur separatists in Turkey and other countries cannot
funnel money and weapons into the XAR through Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan
or Tajikistan. It is not surprising that at the SCO conclave, Hu
expressed hopes about "deepened cooperation among SCO member nations
in arresting members of the 'three evil forces'" of terrorism,
separatism and religious extremism" (China Daily, August 28; People's
Daily, August 28).
Xinjiang officials have also made it clear that People's Liberation
Army (PLA), PAP and police units would step up their "life-and-death
struggle" in southern and western Xinjiang, where the bulk of
anti-Beijing groups are based. At mobilization meetings convened
before and during the Olympics, XAR Party Secretary Wang Lequan and
member of the XAR CCP Committee in charge of law and order Zhu Hailun
called for "steely" measures to smash the "three evil forces." For
instance, at a provincially televised conference on "stability work"
held during the Olympics, Zhu pointed out that the "people's war"
against separatists and terrorists would be a "long-term and arduous"
undertaking. "We must take the initiative in launching attacks, hit
them [separatists] wherever they show up, and undertake pre-emptive
strikes," said Zhu. He added that law-enforcement personnel must
"close all loopholes … and use their fists of steel to crack down hard
on various disruptive activities" (Xinjiang Daily, August 14 and 19;
Xinhua News Agency, August 20).
Diplomatic analysts in Beijing have pointed out that since
disturbances broke out in Xinjiang and Tibet early this year, the
Central Military Commission has at least on a temporary basis
transferred additional troops and PAP officers to the two autonomous
regions. Among China's seven military regions, the Lanzhou Military
Region (LMR) and the Chengdu Military Region have jurisdiction over
Xinjiang and Tibet, respectively. The LMR, which is responsible for
the provinces of Gansu, Shaanxi, Ningxia, Qinghai and Xinjiang, boasts
two group armies (each with about 30,000 personnel). According to
Professor Ka-Po Ng, a PLA specialist at Aichi Bunkyo University in
Japan, three to four divisions (each with 3,000 or more soldiers) are
stationed in the Xinjiang Military District, which reports to the LMR.
Since early this year the PAP, which maintains two divisions in
Xinjiang, has been focusing on taking out pockets of Uyghur separatism
in southern and western XAR [1]. Moreover, several units from China's
six other military regions have taken part in war games that have
recently been staged in the XAR. For example, jet fighters from the
Nanjing Military Region recently took part in military drills in
western Xinjiang (Ming Pao [Hong Kong], August 4 and 26). Given the
improvements in China-Russia ties – and the fact that tension in the
Taiwan Strait has subsided since Taiwan's pro-reunification
Nationalist Party came to power last May – it is possible that the CMC
may transfer PLA and PAP units responsible for the Sino-Russian border
and for the Taiwan Strait to the restive western regions (Ming Pao,
August 26; Wall Street Journal Asia, August 23)
As of late August, Xinjiang authorities claimed that they had smashed
at least one quasi-terrorist ring that was responsible for two major
August attacks on the PAP and police (Ming Pao, August 31; China News
Service, August 31). Security officials also pointed out that 18
"overseas-trained terrorists" had been nabbed this year (People's
Daily, August 6). Yet owing to the news blackout particularly in
southern and western XAR, little is known about the extent to which
the troops and police have succeeded in eradicating the "terrorist
gangs." What is certain is that compared to recent years, more arrests
of destabilizing elements have been made, and that control of and
surveillance over large numbers of mosques and lamaseries in Xinjiang
and Tibet, respectively, has intensified. In Tibet, the authorities
have boosted the numbers of PAP officers guarding lamaseries,
particularly those viewed by Beijing as headquarters for
insurrectionary activities (The Guardian [London], August 22; Wall
Street Journal Asia, August 23; Times of London, August 25). While
visiting France last month, the Dalai Lama told Le Monde that about
10,000 Tibetans in Tibet and nearby provinces had been detained by
police since early this year, and that Chinese authorities were
"accelerating the construction of military camps." "The military
presence in Tibet is old, but the frenzy of new construction in the
Amdo and Kham regions makes me say that this colonization by the army
is designed to last," he said (The Associated Press, August 21;
Reuters, August 22).
In accordance with Beijing's long-standing carrot-and-stick approach,
the CCP leadership is also boosting united front efforts so as to win
over ethnic minorities through channeling more funds for economic
development and welfare payouts. While most of the Politburo Standing
Committee members remained in Beijing during the Olympics, Premier Wen
Jiabao visited the Ningxia Autonomous Region, where he preached the
gospel of the harmonious coexistence of nationalities. While talking
to members of the Muslim minorities in Ningxia, which borders
Xinjiang, Wen said: "The party and government will never forget you.
Muslim and Han Chinese are brothers." The premier indicated that there
would be more transfer payments from the central government to
energize the economy and to expand the social security net. "We will
not only improve environmental conditions but also ensure that
peasants can grow reach," the official media quoted Wen as saying (CCP
News net, August 19; Xinhua News Agency, August 18).
Xinjiang authorities have recently announced a plethora of statistics
that seems to show that the economy is doing well while social welfare
for disadvantaged sectors has been augmented. For example, 20 billion
yuan was spent in the first half of the year on irrigation, industry
and transport infrastructure in the XAR. In the same period, jobs were
found for 12,350 Xinjiang residents who lacked technical and other
sought-after qualifications: 49.7 percent of these were members of
ethnic minorities and 53.2 percent of them female (Xinjiang Daily,
July 11; Xinjiang Peace Net, August 12). In an apparent effort to
settle disputes amicably between Xinjiang residents and government
departments, judicial and law-enforcement agencies have since early
2008 been using mediation and other "harmonious methods" to diffuse
what the party calls "contradictions among the people." Du Jianxi,
Party Secretary of the XAR Judicial Department, indicated last month
that front-line law-enforcement officials who had successfully
addressed grievances by the masses would be rewarded with promotions.
Police and judicial offices have also been asked by XAR authorities to
be "more open and helpful" in resolving petitions filed by residents
who have gripes against individual government departments (Xinjiang
Peace Net, August 8).
These palliatives notwithstanding, some observers fear that the
Olympics – particularly Beijing's harsh policies toward upholding
stability in the two autonomous regions – could become a milestone in
the deterioration of ties between Han Chinese on the one hand and
Uyghur and Tibetans on the other. And while the PAP and police may be
justified in stamping out violent or "quasi-terrorist" gangs, a good
proportion of Tibet and Xinjiang residents feel they have also been
targeted just because of their ethnicity. Thus in the run-up to the
Games, Uyghur and Tibetans ranging from hawkers to big-spending
businessmen could not find hotels along the coast. Widely deemed to be
security risks, Uyghur and Tibetans were also subject to frequent
inspection and interrogation by police. Yili Hamu, a Uyghur lecturer
at Beijing's Central University for Nationalities, told the Hong Kong
media that he was worried about increasingly fragile ties between his
people and Han Chinese. "We understand the security requirements of
the Olympics," Yili Hamu said. "Yet such measures should not be aimed
at specific groups." The scholar claimed that discrimination against
Uyghur was palpable. He added that many Uyghur "fear being
marginalized even as they are being deprived of opportunities to share
in the wealth created by oil fields and other economic development in
the XAR" (Cable News [Hong Kong], August 4).
As for Tibet, whatever enthusiasm that CCP authorities may have in
seeking a negotiated settlement with the exiled government seems to
have fizzled out with the end of the Summer Games. After two fruitless
sessions between the party's United Front Department and the Dalai
Lama's emissaries, no new meetings have been scheduled. In the
meantime, attention has been focused on whether Beijing will speed up
so-called Sinicization of the region, mainly through encouraging more
Han Chinese to migrate to and work in Tibet. In his meetings with
French parliamentarians last month, the Dalai Lama asserted that
Beijing would accelerate the process of moving as many as a million
Chinese to Tibet after the Olympics (Reuters, August 22). Also in
August, the Ministry of Railways announced that six branch lines would
be added to the Qinghai-Tibet rail network, which has been criticized
by the Tibet exiled government as primarily a vehicle for Sinicization
(China Times, August 19).
While top leaders such as President Hu and Premier Wen have steered
clear of making comments on Beijing's problematic relations with
Uyghurs and Tibetans, it is clear that the CCP leadership has
abandoned the conciliatory ethnic policies associated with former
party chief Hu Yaobang, who headed the CCP's liberal wing in the early
to mid-1980s. After hitting a brief high note with the string of
shuttle talks between Beijing and representatives of the Dalai Lama in
the lead up to the Olympics, communications have broken down between
Beijing and dissident groups in Xinjiang and Tibet, and the
possibilities are high that an exacerbation of Beijing's hard-line,
play-tough tactics in the two autonomous regions could stoke mutual
suspicions – and nudge relations between Han Chinese and ethnic
minorities into a vicious cycle.
Willy Lam
Notes
1. Author's interview with Dr. Ng on August 31, 2008.