Introduction:
The situation in Darfur which is described by the UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, as “ethnic cleansing”, by President George W. Bush as “atrocities, which are displacing hundreds of thousands of civilians”, and by Mukesh Kapila, UN Humanitarian Coordinator for Sudan, as “…the world’s greatest humanitarian crisis”, is a tragedy the Sudanese state created to transform the Sudanese society into a “pure” Arab society which’s population will only be composed of those who trace, through mythical stories, their origins to core Arab countries- particularly to Saudi Arabia. To achieve this objective the rulers marked off the indigenous population of Darfur as the “Other” of their state and are therefore worth to be destroyed because they believe that their presence disturbs the “homogeneity” of the imagined “pure” Arab society about which they have been dreaming. The elite whose thinking Arabism dominates, its members themselves are not recognized as fellow Arabs in most of the countries to which they are tied nostalgically. Therefore, the Arabism of Sudan, which generates its Africanism as the opposite force, is cultural and has been gradually dominating the Sudanese society as part of the official political discourse.
Although the majority of the Sudanese population is indigenous African (70%), Umma Party and National Islamic Front aimed at transforming Sudan into a pure Arab society and Darfuris, Kordofanis and southern Sudanese themselves are used as military tools toward achieving that goal first in the south. As Arabization of the south became difficult and its secession possible, the Arabo-Islamists in National Islamic Front sought to achieve the Arabization of the north by all means including genocide. In this paper I am explaining how the Sudanese state and its political parties racialized interactions between different ethnic groups in Darfur to create a “homogenous” Arab state at least in what is known as northern Sudan to which I refer political north.
Background:
Darfur, western most region of Sudan, covers 500,000 sq km and is inhabited by about 7 million people of different ethnic and cultural backgrounds. The Darfuris are largely Muslims and Arabic is a lingua-franca despite the existence of over twenty other languages. In addition to clan labels like Rizeigat, Bani Halba, Jallool, etc., the term Arab existed as a reference to these inhabitants who trace their ethnic origins to core Arab countries. As to the Zurga (indigenous Africans), they were referred to by ethnic/tribal labels such as Fur, Berti, Dajo, Massaleet, etc. Although most of the Zurga were farmers and Arabs were herders, interactions between individuals from Arab and Zurga communities were mostly peaceful- and in several cases complementary relationships developed between herding and farming communities. The nature of the complementary relationships between some farming and herding communities was based on the provision of the farming communities to the herding ones with farm products like millet, sorghum, vegetables and fruits whereas the herding communities provided the farming communities with animal products such as meat, milk, hides and butter. Farmers also gave their livestock to herders who took them to rich pasturelands in dry years and the herders left weak animals and heavy belongings with farmers. Therefore, friendships developed between members of the two groups to the extent that they intermarried and borrowed from each other’s culture. As a result of these peaceful interactions between Arabs and indigenous Africans, groups like Berti, Borno, Birguid, and Tunjur mainly speak Arabic and many Arabs also speak Fur.
However, Darfur society was not conflict free. Wars were fought between individuals and groups but most of the wars that were fought before the mid 1980s were between Arab clans. For example the major wars between Rizeigat and Ma’alia in 1960s, Mahria and Bani Halba in 1970s, and Guimir and Fallata in 1980s only involved groups that identified themselves as Arabs. The only conflict that involved Zurga and Arab was in 1960s between the Zagawa and Mahria. However, these conflicts were over resources and were fought in a limited scope and authorities of the native administration (e.g. Magdoum, Shartaye, Nazir, Omda, etc.) were able to contain them easily and the government played the role of impartial judge or just parent who wanted to stop the fight between his/her fighting children.
National Reconciliation and Politicization of Ethnic Relations:
Since the national reconciliation that Numeiri’s regime and the exiled political parties signed in 1977, Darfur became a fertile ground for clandestine activities of National Islamic Front and Umma Party which aimed at overthrowing that regime. As both parties were influenced by Libya’s Arab Nationalism, they successfully transmitted its ideas to Arabs among their constituents in Darfur who invented a signifying term of difference, Zurga, in early 1980s as a marker for non-Arab indigenous population. However, the word azrag (plural zurug) existed in western Sudanese Arabic and it was a reference for any person whose color was darker than others. Since its invention in 1980s, the word Zurga was charged with stereotypes (e.g. lower human beings, pagans, those who deserve to be enslaved, etc.) related to the legacy of slavery and racialized discrimination in Sudan. Since then, Arab clans largely acted as a unified group whereas the Zurga continued to act as individual ethnic groups (e.g. Berti, Fur, Massaleet, Midaub, etc.) until 1998 when the attacks of the Arab militias forced them to grasp the term Zurga and charge it with their own meanings (e.g. indigenous, original, owners of the land, etc.).
The invention of the term Zurga is a result of the idea of Alhizam Al-‘Arabi (the Arab-Belt) that Umma Party and National Islamic Front secretly marketed among the Arabs of western Sudan. Alhizam Al-‘Arabi’s objective was to transform the African Sahel that lies between the Red Sea and the Atlantic Ocean into a pure Arab region, but Numeiri’s regime was an obstacle for the strategies aimed at the realization of this project. After Numeiri was overthrown in 1985, people of Darfur often observed military vehicles loaded with weapons and soldiers entering Darfur from the north and heading to Arab nomads’ camps. In the same year (1985) the Deputy Minister of Defense distributed weapons to Arabs of western Sudan on the pretext that they needed them to defend themselves against the SPLA’s attacks despite the SPLA/M’s clear message that its objective is to establish a New Sudan which’s citizens are treated equally.
On the other hand, Chadian military elements, loyal to the government that was overthrown by Hussein Habri in 1982, crossed the border with their arms to Darfur and many of them sold their arms to purchase food. After Al-Sadig Al-Mahdi came to power in Sudan in 1986 more arms were distributed to the same Arab groups whom the transitional government had previously armed. Al-Mahdi’s government even took a further step toward legitimizing the armament of Arabs by labeling them murahileen (wandering herders). The Arab ethnic groups in the region had now accumulated arms and were energized by the idea of Alhizam Al-‘Arabi, they only needed the definition of the target and cooperation of the state.
Banditry and First Racialized War in Darfur:
Heavily armed and mobilized by the idea of Arab Belt, the Arabs started banditry which targeted the Fur- the largest Zurga group. As a result of systematic banditry, the Fur lost thousands of heads of livestock between 1983 and 1987, counted dozens dead and dozens wounded. Annoyed by the central government’s indifference towards the terrible incidents of banditry in Darfur, Darfuris in Khartoum and central Sudan organized a peaceful protest march in Khartoum in 1987 to warn the government about the problem. To the surprise of those concerned about the banditry in Darfur, Al-Mahdi’s government authorized the police to open fire on the protesters who would have counted several victims had the chief justice passed the order. Until this stage, the other Zurga thought the problem only concerned the Fur and even some Zagawa also involved in banditry against the Fur. As regional and central governments were not concerned about the banditry, Arabs of Darfur took a further step and formed an organization (Altajamu’u Ala’arabi- Arab Alliance) to follow up a series of demands with the central government and leaders of Umma Party and National Islamic Front. Therefore, representatives of over 20 Arab clans wrote a document in September 1987 to Prime Minister, Al-Sadig Al-Mahdi, and copied it to the State’s Supreme Council and to different political parties. The following passage includes some of the points the document raised:
.…As Arabs we feel that we were deprived of the right of representation in the leadership of this region, and participation in the decision making and were reduced to a weightless majority- subjects and not citizens despite the fact that we represent the followings: 1) 70% of the population of the region, 2) 40% of the total of educated people including hundreds who obtained Sudan School Certificate, 3) 15% of the contribution to national income, 4) 90% of the contribution to regional income, 5) the lion’s share contribution to the Sudanese army which we sacrifice for this nation and 6) represented by 14 members of the parliament. Honorable Prime Minister, all the evidence we have presented confirms the political, social and economic weights which these groups have on the region. We therefore request for at least 50% of the positions in the regional and central governments. We are afraid that the continuous negligence of the Arab race from the participation might lead to something which’s result will not be praised.
It might be true that the Arabs were represented by 14 members in the parliament in 1987 and had a lion’s share in the Sudanese army, but they counted less than 40% of the population of the region and their contribution to its economy was about 30%. As Arabs were herders, their contribution to agriculture was minimal, and they were absent in the trading sector and even in herding Arabs were not alone since Zurga like the Midaub and Zagawa were largely camel herders and the Fur and other Zurga mixed farming with herding. Again the way the authors of the document dismissed the Zurga’s contribution to the foundation of any civilization in Darfur reflects their influence by the state sponsored discourse of Arabism that aimed at absenting the indigenous African population from national scene. Although signatories of that document were holding ministerial portfolios in the regional government, nobody asked them to resign, and the whole issue passed as if nothing dangerous was unfolding.
In contrast, members of Nahnu Kadugli (We are Kadugli), an association that Nuba intellectuals formed in 1980s to enlighten their people about the discrimination in Sudan, were jailed and others were extrajudicially killed and their organization was labeled as racist. Moreover, it was raised in the parliament that the immunity should be removed from Nuba MPs who were members of Nahnu Kadugli so that they could be trialed. But the members of Arab Alliance were immune despite its eminent threat to the stability of Darfur society.
Whether Mr. Al-Mahdi authorized them or they understood his silence as authorization, the Arabs launched aggressive attacks on the villages and markets of the Fur killing people, and looting homes, vehicles and shops before torching them, and rustling the livestock. The military forces that were brought to the targeted villages and towns failed to protect them- their commanders argued that the Ministry of Defense did not give them orders to shoot Arab militias that were devastating the villages. For example, seven neighboring villages were torched and 11 villagers killed in three days before the town of Kidinyeer was attacked in August 1988. The surviving population of these villages fled to Kidinyeer where an army force was. At dusk, on the fourth day, the population of Kidinyeer was horrified by shootings on the southern side of the town and most of them fled into the mountains. The few men who remained ran to the army garrison and wondered why the soldiers did not stop the militia that was destroying the town. The commander replied that he did not receive orders to stop them. The Shartaye (chief) of the area asked the commander to allow him use a mortar of the army force to defend his town since the soldiers did not have orders to defend it, but his request infuriated the commander who locked him up in a classroom until the following day after his town was all destroyed. As a result of horror, two women gave birth prematurely and three others who recently gave birth became seriously ill because they ran several kilometers before they arrived at secure places into the mountains. This is only one area which I visited during the time of truce in 1990 and asked individuals to narrate their own experiences during the attack on their town and its surroundings.
Although Jaridat Alnahda (newspaper owned and edited by a Darfuri) reported everyday about the massacres and the destruction of villages in Darfur, the central government seemed unconcerned and nobody from its cabinet visited the destroyed villages or paid condolences to those who lost their relatives. Most of the political parties also seemed unconcerned about the devastation in Darfur and Darfur MPs whose areas were in flames were weak, passive, and so tied up by programs of their parties to extent that they could not express any opinion against the unfolding devastation in Darfur. For instance, two other executive members of Jabel Marra Students’ Association and I paid a visit to an MP whose riding experienced huge human and material losses during these attacks and criticized him about his silence in the parliament. The poor MP responded that he could not do anything about it because he was put under the oath not to oppose the programs of his party until his mandate as MP expired. The Fur tried to defend themselves and their properties but inflicted most of the losses for three reasons: first, they were defending rather than attacking; second, the army commanders often intervened on behalf of the attackers; and third, Umma Party and National Islamic Front contributed millions of Sudanese pounds to support the Arabs. Therefore, the followings were the losses the Fur inflicted between February 1988 and June 1989: 5,346 dead, 126,000 heads of animals rustled, 17,500 houses and 314 shops looted and torched, 7 trucks and 11 grinders destroyed, 53,800 people made homeless, and 530,000 Sudanese pounds taken away.
It was during this catastrophe in Darfur (1988-1989) when a high school female student (Ameera) disappeared in Khartoum. She was said to be a victim of a love story which resulted in unsuccessful abortion. Demonstrations of protest came out of Khartoum mosques to the streets, in response to her mysterious disappearance. The differential attitude of the central government, political parties, mosques and even the street in Khartoum concerning Ameera’s story in Khartoum and Fur’s destruction in Darfur explains that Sudanese state estranged certain categories of its population and transformed them into Others and therefore less than citizens.
The National Islamic Front, Umma Party and Ba’ath Party were biased in their reports about the conflict. The Ba’ath reported in its newspaper that planes came from Germany and landed in Jabel Marra where they distributed weapons to the Fur. It was a propaganda aimed at convincing the Sudanese public that the Fur had rebelled and the Sudanese army should have directly involved in their attack. In its newspapers of Alwan and Al-Rayat, National Islamic Front unjustly made the Fur unbelievers addressing to the conflict as between ‘Arab Al- Muslimeen wa-Al-Fur (The Muslim Arabs and Fur). It, therefore, reduced Islam to a cultural aspect which’s members are racially Arabs. After its coup d’etat in 1989, the National Islamic Front openly questioned the Islam of the indigenous African population including that of Darfuris which’s Ramadan observing committee’s testimony about the moon of Ramadan in 1996 Khartoum refused to approve.
Arabo-Islamists and Genocide in Darfur (1989-2004):
The imposition of Arabic language and culture on Zurga in Darfur goes back to the days of colonial administration when Arab culture was made a product of a civilization- but a “stagnant and decadent” civilization compared to the Western European one, and the indigenous African cultures were reduced to backward cultures which’s members were destined to be Arabized in the long run. Therefore, the colonial administrators treated the indigenous population of the political north as future subjects of the Arabized Muslims and excluded them from the means of power like education and economic development projects. So the Sudanese indigenous population of the political north was excluded from the political discourse which preceded the independence of the country and shaped it politically and socially. That discourse was limited to two elites, one from the political north identifying itself as Arab and Muslim and another from the political south identifying itself as African and Christian. The Sudanese of the other identifications (e.g. non-Arabized Muslims, non-indigenous African Christians, non-Muslim and non-Christian Arabs, etc.) were excluded. Therefore, the indigenous African Muslim population in the political north was represented by elite that tried to assimilate it and distanced itself from it at the same time.
The assimilation process took several forms in Darfur one of which was the ban of communication in indigenous languages in primary schools during 1960s and 1970s, and another was the focus on Arabic language and Islamic studies in high schools throughout 1980s. However, the state has since 1990s, adopted mashru’ altawajjuh al-hadari (civilizing orientation project) which further distanced the indigenous African Muslim population because “the civilizing project” reduced Islam to a racial phenomenon. The indigenous African population was thus marked as the Other of the Sudanese state, and it therefore lost the right of existence in it. Encouraged by the state discourse of Arabism, members of Arab Alliance produced two documents known as Qureish 1 and Qureish 2, which’s objective was to create a pure Arab society. The four important strategies that the planners of the Qureish State put forward were: 1) to dominate the Sudanese army and security forces; 2) to assassinate leaders of indigenous origin in Darfur and Kordofan; 3) to force the indigenous population out of their areas and; 4) to convince the government that the indigenous population in Darfur and Kordofan were rebels.
The Qureishists included in their targets Zagawa’s villages in 1994 and Massaleet’s villages in 1996 in addition to these of the Fur. The state rather than defending the targeted ethnic groups gave their areas to Arabs some of whom were invited from neighboring countries and leaders who complained against such violations were jailed and tortured. Dawood Bolad’s (1990-1992) rebellion further doubled the Arabo-Islamist state’s rage which since then labeled the Fur as rebels and rounded them on throughout the country. Consequently, over 4,000 indigenous people were killed between 1990 and 2002.
The complicity of indigenous Arabs with the government gave birth to SLA/M and Sudan JEM as defenders of the indigenous population’s right to life. The government took their rise as the opportunity to justify the indiscriminate destruction of the indigenous population regardless of their sex, gender, age, status, etc. killing over 350, 000 civilians and the number of those who have been dying of hunger and hunger related diseases is unknown but is expected to be much higher, over a million were internally displaced living in concentration camps and about 230,000 fled to Chad. There are about two more million civilians who have been cut up in the areas that are controlled by SLA/M and Sudan JEM in different parts of the region including Jabel Marra which’s topography provides natural protection to over a million Fur. The civilians in these areas are in very critical conditions since the government refuses to relief organizations to approach them. Moreover, about 3000 women were raped, and thousands of young men were seized from the IDP camps, cities, markets, villages and on the road and killed extrajudicially. The Sudanese authorities often make it difficult for international organizations to reach the IDP camps, and government forces even attack them oftentimes.
Peace Requirements:
The situation in Darfur is beyond description and it therefore needs immediate and long-term solutions. I summarize the immediate solutions in the following points: 1) the different factions of SLA/M, Sudan JEM, and Federal Democratic Alliance must unite and address the problem in one voice; 2) the international community should intervene militarily to stop the genocide and open access to relief organizations to reach the needy population; 3) the Janjaweed and other paramilitary forces should be disarmed; 4) the Arabs that have settled by force in hawakeer other than theirs should leave these areas; 5) the destroyed villages and towns should be rehabilitated and their legitimate inhabitants repatriated; 6) the Sudanese government should pay compensations and reparations for human and material losses; 7) the individuals involved in war crimes and crimes against humanity must be taken to the ICC and; 8) there should be a program focusing on mending the Darfur society.
For the long-term solutions Darfur needs regional and national talks. The regional peace talks should focus on adopting a system that makes Darfur a confederal part of a liberal democratic Sudan with clearly defined relations between them in which Darfur is protected by the right of self determination. The national talks, on the other hand, should involve all the Sudanese regions and their focus should be the drafting of a lasting constitution that clearly prohibits the intervention of the military in politics, separates religion from the state, accords all freedoms to all Sudanese and provides them with equal rights and obligations, and embraces liberal democracy as the only system for the rule of Sudan.
Conclusion:
In this paper I gave a historical background to the crisis in Darfur to clarify the confusion which many people, who do not know the social, political and cultural structure of Sudan, may have concerning the nature of conflict in Darfur. I have argued that the problem of Darfur is a legal problem with political and cultural dimensions rather than conflict over resources caused by the changes in the region’s environment and rulers of Sudan are involved directly in it. Therefore, the dimension of the disaster and the means that were adopted to cause it qualify it to genocide. As the Sudanese state is adamant in continuing the destruction of Darfur’s indigenous population, despite the pressure of international community to stop the genocide, it lost both the rights and obligations of parenthood towards its Zurga subjects who equally lost confidence in it and the birth of a new system that will equally embrace all the Sudanese is necessary.
