On 17 June Sudan proclaimed an end to its opposition to a United Nations-commanded peacekeeping force. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon acknowledged that the breakthrough “could yet come undone” and that even if the deployment went ahead as soon as possible (in 2008), “the fighting will probably go on” until then.

The force of about 23,000 will not be able to protect civilians on the ground even if Khartoum keeps its word, and Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir’s word, thus far, inspires little confidence. He has strung the international community along, breaking commitment after commitment, throughout the war in Darfur.
His use of the term “unconditional” to characterise Sudan’s acceptance of the ground force is sophistry. Al-Bashir has forced the international community to accept a ‘hybrid force’ with the African Union (which last year declared itself unequal to the task of civilian protection), rather than the UN Chapter VII force mandated by the Security Council.

He has held up deployment of this hybrid force in attenuated ‘phases’. To this day, Sudanese officials claim that the force will have a peacekeeping mandate – rather than one that can actively intervene to protect civilians from the depredations of the Sudanese-backed Janjaweed militia, or other armed groups.

International pressure for civilian protection has been reduced without Khartoum having to give away a thing in the immediate term.

A no-fly zone, operated from France’s air bases in neighbouring Chad, should be launched as a down-payment on full co-operation by Khartoum. This would help ensure that the UN-commanded ground force would be deployed as soon as the contributions can be collected from UN members.

Last month French General Henri Bentegeat, head of the EU Military Committee, called a no-fly zone “technically impossible – Darfur is around the same size as France”. At least 60 combat aircraft would be required, he said, and there would be potential confusion among Sudanese and other aircraft: “The only viable solution is to deploy a very large force that would throw a security net around the region.’’

Our view is that a much smaller number of fighter aircraft, perhaps 12-18, plus tankers and AWACS radar control aircraft to direct them, would be enough to mount a credible no-fly operation. It could be accomplished very rapidly, given the amount of NATO and EU tactical aviation available. The French airbases at Abeche and N’Djamena in Chad, which field Mirage fighter jets, should be able to handle this operation. Air refueling would eliminate Darfur’s area as an operational impediment. Commercial aviation would have to be re-routed.

While Sudan has modern Russian MiG-29s in its arsenal, its attacks on ground targets in Darfur have been mounted with Antonov transport aircraft fitted as bombers and Mi-24 attack helicopters. Its combat aviation and air defence capabilities are no match for NATO airpower.

Bentegeat seems to think there is a choice to be made between a no-fly zone and a sufficient ground force in Darfur. Yet it seems far more likely that mounting a no-fly zone now would deter Sudanese belligerent aviation and transport of combatant personnel to Darfur. Sudanese ground forces, both irregular and regular, would be at risk under unfriendly skies for the first time in their four-year campaign to depopulate Darfur.

Only the most gullible can believe that Omar al-Bashir will allow an infantry force into Darfur without further obstructionism. If we are serious about protecting civilians, we cannot merely wait to see if Khartoum is serious. We should leave it no other option.

France’s policy is the pivotal factor, given its infrastructure in Chad. Both President Nicolas Sarkozy and Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner have called for more effective action on Darfur. France has begun humanitarian aid flights to eastern Chad.

The problem is not one of capability or availability of requisite airpower. It remains, as it has for three years now, one of political will.

General Merrill A. McPeak was US Air Force chief of staff in 1990-94. He oversaw Operation Desert Storm and the Iraqi and Adriatic no-fly zones.

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