Amidst escalating violence and increasing attacks on humanitarian
workers, aid to conflict-affected civilians continues to collapse
Eric Reeves
July 29, 2006
Despite the blandly disingenuous words of UN officials such as Jan
Pronk, and the shameful silence of African Union officials, the
catastrophe in Darfur continues to deepen---relentlessly, dangerously,
uncontrollably. Malnutrition and mortality are rising rapidly, and
growing water shortages will result in the increased use of unsanitary
ground water during the current rainy season. Water-borne diseases
are already increasingly prevalent and will continue to spread through
September. The current outbreak of cholera is poised to explode in
any number of camps that have diminished humanitarian resources, fewer
sanitary latrines, and in many cases are still absorbing large numbers
of newly displaced persons as violence continues apace in many
locations.
Insecurity has also increased steadily, with a recent spate of deadly
attacks on humanitarians that has produced evacuations and suspensions
of operations. As Doctors Without Borders/ Médecins Sans Frontières
(MSF) notes this week in its "latest operational update":
"Despite the signing of a peace agreement in early May, violence has
escalated. While the government and rebels have clashed and attacks on
civilians have continued in certain areas of Darfur, fighting between
different branches of the rebellion has increased, plunging Darfur
into deeper insecurity." (MSF, "Assistance in Darfur Hanging by a
Thread," July 26, 2006
As a consequence, over 2 million people in Darfur remain trapped in
camps for Internally Displaced Persons, civilians "too scared to
return to their homes and continue to live in camps that amount to
open-air jails" (MSF update). And the camps themselves are
increasingly dangerous, with a growing prevalence of weapons, the
presence of rebels soldiers, and deadly incursions into the camps by
Khartoum's Janjaweed militia proxy.
At the same time, the Darfur Peace Agreement of May 5, 2006 has
collapsed completely, even as Khartoum has made clear that it has no
intention of re-starting or re-energizing the peace process:
"Assistant to the Sudanese President and Deputy Chairman of the ruling
National Congress Party [the renamed National Islamic Front---ER],
Nafie Ali Nafie, pointed out that the file of negotiation on Darfur
was closed finally, and will never be opened again whatever the
reasons are." (Sudan Tribune [dateline: Khartoum], July 24, 2006)
And although the fatuous Jan Pronk, Kofi Annan's special
representative to Sudan, declared earlier this week that "Sudan has
left a 'tiny' window open for negotiation on accepting UN troops in
its violent Darfur region" (Reuters [dateline: Khartoum], July 26,
2006), this claim has no meaningful basis. Pronk could only point to
an expedient statement made by Khartoum's Foreign Minister, Lam Akol,
earlier this month at the Brussels donors' meeting for the African
Union force in Darfur:
"'The minister of foreign affairs declared in Brussels ... that the
decision [on deployment of a UN force] has not yet been taken,'
[Pronk] told a news conference in Khartoum. The international
community has seen this as an opening, a very tiny opening---I don't
know how big it is.'" (Reuters [dateline: Khartoum], July 26, 2006)
Pronk has not had long to wait to find out "how big it is": yesterday
(July 28, 2006) NIF President and Field Marshal Omar el-Bashir
reiterated his previous brazen threat to turn Darfur into a
"graveyard" for any deploying UN force:
"Sudanese President Omer al- Bashir warned yesterday that Darfur would
become a 'graveyard' for United Nations forces if they were deployed
in the west Sudan region, the state-run SUNA news agency said. 'We
shall never hand Darfur over to international forces which will never
enjoy being in the region that will become their graveyard,' Bashir
was quoted as telling a rally at Zeribah in North Kordofan, central
Sudan." (Reuters, "Sudan's Bashir reiterates Darfur would be UN troops
'graveyard,' [dateline: Khartoum], July 28, 2006).
Nafie Ali Nafie and Omar el-Bashir speak much more authoritatively for
the National Islamic Front regime than Lam Akol, the lapdog "Foreign
Minister" from the southern SPLM. That Pronk would attempt to use
statements by the powerless Lam Akol as a sign of encouragement for
the possibility of UN deployment is a mark of desperation or
disingenuousness, which are hardly to be distinguished in the
relentlessly misguided Pronk.
KHARTOUM LAUNCHES MAJOR, COORDINATED MILITARY OFFENSIVES
Even more destructive of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) are the
wide-ranging military offensives launched by Khartoum's regular armed
forces and Janjaweed allies in the Jebel Moon area of West Darfur and
the KulKul area north of el-Fasher (North Darfur State):
"Sudanese government forces and allied [Janjaweed] militias attacked
bases of a new rebel alliance in Darfur despite a cease-fire in the
violent west, [UN and African Union] officials and rebels said on
Saturday [July 29, 2006]."
"An unpopular African Union-mediated peace deal was signed in May by
only one of three rebel negotiating factions. Many leaders who did not
sign formed a new group called the National Redemption Front (NRF),
which began military operations earlier this month in the Kordofan
area neighboring Darfur. 'Yesterday [July 28, 2006] all day and until
the evening the government of Sudan with the Janjaweed attacked Jabel
Moun and KulKul, north of el-Fasher,' Abu Bakr Hamid al-Nur, a rebel
NRF commander, told Reuters from Darfur on Saturday."
"Jabel Moun is a mountainous area on the Sudan-Chad border. Kulkul is
35 km (22 miles) north of Darfur's main town el-Fasher [and the site
of several IDP camps---ER]. Nur said the government used Antonov
planes and three attack helicopters to bombard the areas, forcing
hundreds of civilians to flee their homes and seek refuge in
el-Fasher." (Reuters [dateline: Khartoum], July 29, 2006)
Pronk himself was forced by these exceedingly ominous events to issue
a statement with Baba Gana Kingibe, the AU special representative and
Pronk's equal in any number of unflattering respects, declaring that
they,
"are deeply concerned about the fighting that erupted today in Jebel
Moon (West Darfur) involving, according to reports reaching the
African Mission in Sudan, a combined operation by the Janjaweed
militia and the Government Armed Forces against forces believed to be
of the non-signatories to the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA). [The two
special representatives] recall that any attack on any party to the
Darfur conflict is either a breach of the DPA or a violation of
previous agreements concluded on the basis of the N'Djamena Ceasefire
Agreement [April 2004]." (Joint AU/UN Statement, July 28, 2006)
Khartoum never had any intention of abiding by either the Darfur Peace
Agreement or the N'Djamena ceasefire, and the major, well-prepared
attacks of yesterday are only the most conspicuous evidence of bad
faith to date.
MINNI MINAWI: "JANJAWEED 2"
Although Khartoum's culpability in this renewed act of war is patent
here, the chaotic nature of the fighting and the factionalizing of the
combatants needs some clarification, particularly as this
factionalized fighting on the part of the Darfuri insurgency movements
is now a primary source of insecurity throughout Darfur.
The main fighting elements of the "National Redemption Force" (NRF) in
North Darfur are those of the Sudan Liberation Army faction know as
SLA-United, or SLA-G19 after the 19 SLA commanders who split from
Abdel Wahid el-Nur. Abdel Wahid is the SLA leader who did not sign the
Abuja agreement and who shows signs of both political and military
weakness and increasing isolation Because he is a Fur, however, the
largest ethnic group in Darfur, he retains considerable significance
in any peace or reconciliation effort. Abdel Wahid's primary military
base is in the rugged Jebel Marra area in central Darfur.
SLA-United/SLA-G19 enjoys considerable popular support and has gained
military control over virtually all territory north of el-Fasher in
North Darfur, having defeated the forces of yet another SLA faction,
that of Minni Minawi, who did sign the Abjua accord and is widely
reviled by Darfuris, even those in his own Zaghawa tribe. It is
Minawi who has been receiving military support directly from Khartoum
in his attacks on civilians in North Darfur in a desperate bid to
regain his previous control of the area. Minawi is slated to become
the fourth-ranking member of the National Islamic Front "Government of
National Unity," with the title of "Presidential Assistant."
A recent report received by this writer from the ground in North
Darfur, from a Sudanese national with exceptional access and contacts
(and not allied with any faction), reports of Minawi's forces:
"Minni Minawi does not control North Darfur; the group
[SLA/United-SLA/G19] that does control the northern part of North
Darfur is accusing the African Union (AU) of supporting the Government
of Sudan and Minni Minawi. In an attempt to open a dialogue between
the AU and those who control the territory (in order to facilitate
access for nongovernmental humanitarian organizations),
SLA-United/SLA-G19 agreed to meet with political figures from the AU
in their own territory. But while the meeting was convening, the
Government of Sudan sent 10 vehicles with armor and heavy weaponry in
the direction of the meeting. This intelligence came even as one
rebel commander was criticizing the AU for cooperating with the
Government of Sudan." [The obvious implication is that the AU tipped
off Khartoum's forces as to the location of the meeting---ER]
"Minni Minawi's forces in the south of Darfur are in disarray,
entering IDP camps, threatening them, beating them, and looting their
property. In el-Fasher Minawi's forces are roaming the town drunken
and spending their time with prostitutes. In Khartoum Minawi is fully
controlled by the National Congress Party [National Islamic Front],
and those who object to this are expelled from Minawi's SLA faction."
"Cooperation between Minawi and the Government of Sudan in the most
recent fighting in North Darfur is very clear: Government of Sudan
trucks were captured, supply orders were found, and Government of
Sudan soldiers are being held as prisoners of war, and have been shown
to the International Committee of the Red Cross. Some Government of
Sudan soldiers were from Southern Sudan and they were brought by
Khartoum to train Minawi soldiers on new heavy artillery made and
supplied by the Government of Sudan."
"The US is banking on a looser in Minni Minawi, and by the time he
returns from the US [where he recently met with President Bush and
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice], he will be at a total loss,
without forces, political support, or land under his control."
"Violence is getting worse, as are banditry and Janjaweed activities.
The Government of Sudan is happy." (email to this writer from
el-Fasher, received July 24, 2006; text edited for clarity and to
protect the source).
A subsequent email from this same exceptionally well-informed source
on the ground reports:
"Minni Minawi has nothing north of el-Fasher and his official story is
that he lost the area because of Chadian supporting mercenaries---the
same sort of excuses the NIF is using to explain its military actions
in the area."
"The remaining troops loyal to Minawi are out of control. They are
entering Internally Displaced Persons camps in their vicinity, and
armed. Last week they entered ZamZam camp,17 kilometers south of
el-Fasher and arrested 15 civilians claiming that they were soldiers
with them who escaped military service. They entered a girls' school,
and harassed the girls inside classes; when the teacher complained she
was beaten and they told her that they can do anything they wish to
her." [ ]
"All the people in Darfur view Minni Minawi as a criminal, and no one
knows why the United States wants to have anything to do with him. It
is another disaster for US policy." (email to this writer from
el-Fasher, received July 26, 2006; text edited for clarity and to
protect the source).
Refugees International does much to confirm the irresponsible nature
of violence on the part of the US government's new "partner for peace"
in Darfur:
"Leaders from within Minawi's own tribe have separated from him,
leading to intra-Zaghawa fighting as well. [ ] While Minawi and his
soldiers deny responsibility for the violence in Tawilla [west of
el-Fasher in North Darfur] and other towns in the region, a group of
sheikhs said that they knew that Minawi's troops were involved because
they recognized the attackers as their neighbors. Another sheikh
reported that when his town was being attacked, his people were told
that the soldiers would kill half of those who were against Minni
Minawi in order to urge the other half to follow. Other victims from
the region have said that the attackers announced they had arrived to
enforce the peace."
"A spokesperson for the SLA-Minawi faction told Refugees
International, 'We want peace and to punish the people who don't want
peace.' One woman in the Tawilla camp described the nature of these
punishments. She said that hundreds of Minawi's soldiers entered her
village and started shooting. They went inside the houses one by one
shooting the men, including her husband, and beating or raping the
women and girls. The soldiers took whatever they could
find---clothing, shoes, money, livestock. Her story is remarkably
consistent with thousands of others in the region that detail targeted
executions of men and violent, forced displacement."
"The camp residents, an overwhelming number of whom are women, agree
that the situation has deteriorated since the signing of the Darfur
Peace Agreement. One sheikh said, 'There is no peace in Darfur. Our
situation is worse now than ever and this is why no one supports the
Darfur Peace Agreement.' A woman pointed out that at least the
Janjaweed would leave after attacking and looting a village, but
Minawi's SLA faction has stayed to control the area and terrorize the
population. The women are afraid to walk the few hundred meters into
the town market during the day for fear that they will be attacked. An
elderly grandmother was beaten just a few days ago, allegedly by
Minawi's troops, when she tried to return to her farm to begin
planting. The soldiers told her that this was an example of what would
happen to the residents who tried to farm." (Refugees International.
"Town in North Darfur Reflects Changing Nature of Conflict," July 24,
2006)
Amnesty International/Ireland also reports on Minawi's increasingly
brutal civilian predations:
"According to the UN at least 8000 civilians have been displaced in
North Darfur since 5 July [2006]. The vast majority of those displaced
have been driven out by attacks by forces of Minni Minawi's faction of
the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) which is a signatory, with the Sudan
government, to the Darfur Peace Agreement of May 2006. The ferocity of
the attacks, killing and looting by the [Minawi's] SLA has led the
local people to call them the 'Janjawid 2.' Among the 72 said to have
been killed were 10 women and 11 primary school pupils. The reason for
the killings in this area appears to have been because the people in
this area were nearly all members of the Fur ethnic group, which is
closely associated with the SLA (Abdel Wahid el-Nur) faction, opposed
to the SLA (Minni Minawi)." (Amnesty International/Ireland, Update
Bulletin Darfur/Eastern Chad, July 25, 2006)
The US, in its inexcusable haste to ram through a peace agreement in
Darfur, did not care that in the end the only signatories were
Khartoum's genocidaires and the murderous Minni Minawi. The picture
of President Bush and the soon-to-be Presidential Assistant Minni
Minawi of the National Islamic Front makes a mockery of the Bush
administration genocide determination for Darfur, and the President's
consistently glib invocation of the word.
OTHER VIOLENCE IN DARFUR
Amidst this exceedingly dangerous violence the African Union is
failing even more conspicuously. Today's Reuters dispatch notes,
"Advocacy group Refugees International said in a statement on Friday
that 'the AU appears paralyzed, demoralized and unable to provide the
one condition that the 2 million displaced people in Darfur
crave---security.'" (Reuters [dateline: Khartoum], July 29, 2006)
Reports from the ground make clear that the AU is no longer providing
any security in a large majority of the camps, even as these "open-air
prisons" become more explosively violent, and more threatening to aid
workers, a number of whom have recently been killed or experienced
hijackings and other violent attacks:
[1] The humanitarian organization Tearfund reported the death of a
member of its relief team in Deleige (Wadi Saleh), West Darfur:
"It is with shock and deep sadness that Tearfund can confirm the death
of a Sudanese member of its aid relief team in West Darfur, Sudan."
"It is understood that civil unrest escalated in Deleige, northeast of
Garsilla in West Darfur earlier today [July 27, 2006]. 4 staff and 2
vehicles were amidst the troubles, with one staff member badly beaten
and both vehicles significantly damaged."
"This is a serious security incident and we are in the process of
establishing all the details. At this time it is not clear what
triggered the unrest in a community in which Tearfund have been
serving for 20 months. We remain in regular contact with the rest of
the team, who are remaining in the operational base at Garsilla until
a review of operations is completed." [ ]
"Tearfund takes the safety and security of all its staff on overseas
operations extremely seriously. Although the relief programme is not
suspended, we continually assess the risks and are reviewing our
operations in the area."
This last sentence carries the clear implication that suspension of
activities in the extremely insecure West Darfur is a distinct
possibility.
[2] Amnesty International/Ireland reports:
"On 10 July [2006], Oxfam temporarily closed its offices in North
Darfur after failed attempts to find and negotiate the release of an
Oxfam employee who was kidnapped on 3 May [2006]. On 12 July [2006],
an agricultural officer for Relief International was killed resulting
in the suspension of Relief International's operations in the
Kabkabiya area. Some 250,000 displaced in North Darfur did not receive
food aid in June because of insecurity." (Amnesty
International/Ireland, Update Bulletin Darfur/Eastern Chad, July 25,
2006)
[3] Save the Children/USA has reported that one of its ambulance was
hijacked last week in West Darfur.
[4] Mistrust of the Khartoum regime led residents of Hissa Hissa camp
in West Darfur to attack and kill three members of the State Water
Corporation, who were testing the water for safety but were rumored to
be poisoning it and were then assaulted. Though completely
inexcusable, such is the deep distrust and boiling rage in the camps
that these actions will almost certainly be replicated, further
endangering water supplies and other aid operations. (UN News Service,
July 25, 2006)
[5] The security of humanitarian personnel is also directly
threatened by the proliferation of weapons throughout Darfur,
including in the camps, and also by the growing intrusions by
Janjaweed forces into many of the camps, including the vast Kalma camp
near Nyala, South Darfur. The Sudanese Organization Against Torture
(SOAT) reported in a "Human Rights Alert" of July 26, 2006:
"There has been steady gathering of armed militias, reportedly the
Janjaweed in the surrounding areas of Kalma camp. These militias,
besides attacking humanitarian workers, undertake nightly incursions
into the camp for purposes of looting. The militias allege that rather
than raiding the camp, they are responding to alleged theft of their
cows and horses by IDPs from Kalma camp."
"On 29 June 2006, in the early morning, unknown men armed with JM3
machine guns and Kalashnikovs attacked Kalma internally displaced camp
in Nyala killing one person and injuring two others."
Such deadly incursions are intolerable and yet the African Union is
powerless to stop them, and has indeed withdrawn entirely from Kalma
Camp, which only increases the sense of impunity on the part of the
Janjaweed even as it encourages camp residents to provide themselves
with weapons.
These are just some of the assaults in recent weeks that have targeted
or threatened humanitarian workers; there have been many scores of
attacks, kidnappings, and hijackings since security began to
deteriorate badly last August/September, and a number of aid workers
have been killed or wounded. The upshot of such insecurity is that
fewer and fewer of those in need can be reached by humanitarian
efforts. The UN News Service recently reported (July 24, 2006):
"United Nations humanitarian staff in Sudan's strife-torn Darfur
region cannot reach at least one in five of those in need of
assistance because of the ongoing violence and insecurity there, the
UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) reported today. Direct attacks against
humanitarian workers, acts of banditry and fighting among rebel groups
mean the UN has access to less than 80 per cent of beneficiaries, well
below the rates achieved in 2004, according to UNMIS."
2004 was the year of greatest genocidal violence, directed by
Khartoum's regular military forces and Janjaweed allies against the
non-Arab/African populations of Darfur perceived as supporting the
insurgency movements. Rural villages of the Fur, Massalit, and
Zaghawa were particular targets. It is as a result of this earlier
violence that some 2.5 million people have been displaced (including
into neighboring Chad), and that internally displaced persons camps in
Darfur have some 2 million people trapped in terrible conditions.
Even so, access is still less than 80% (likely far less), despite the
enormous concentration produced by mass displacement into IDP and
refugee camps. Doctors Without Borders/Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF)
provides in its recent report a grim account of the further
attenuation of humanitarian relief:
"When the town of Golo in North Darfur state and its surroundings were
attacked at the end of January [2006], uprooting 60,000 people who
fled to the neighboring mountains, MSF teams were forced to evacuate
the town. Since then, MSF has been trying to reach the displaced in
the face of numerous attacks on vehicles operated by humanitarian aid
agencies, including several of MSF's. In recent weeks, in the three
states of Darfur, a spate of serious security incidents affecting MSF
and other organizations has impeded movements and limited the
possibility of providing assistance." [ ]
"Beyond the ongoing violence, MSF is facing the possibility of fewer
aid agencies operating in Darfur. MSF is not an exception, having been
forced to suspend some of its activities in recent weeks. Some aid
agencies have had to evacuate certain regions of Darfur due to
insecurity and attacks. Moreover, for months, nongovernmental
organizations that depend on government funding have been forced to
cut back their programs. If other aid agencies reduce the scope of
their programs, if the quality of the water delivered becomes
inadequate, if malnutrition rates increase, if epidemics emerge, MSF
teams may have to compensate, and our own capacity is already reaching
its limits." [ ]
"In April [2006], the World Food Program (WFP) announced that it was
halving its food allocations for the displaced because of large
funding shortfalls. WFP received increased funds after this
announcement, but it is still incapable of providing full food
distributions. Other than these food distributions, displaced
Darfurians have virtually no resources to ensure their survival.
People cannot farm because of the insecurity that reigns outside the
camps. At most, they can earn a little money selling firewood gathered
in the nearby bush, but even there they risk being attacked."
"And the toughest months lie ahead. The months of July to October
bring both the 'lean' period and the rainy season. The first is
characterized by limited food in the markets and among families who
are still able to farm and would ordinarily be in a position to help
their neighbors. The rainy season is traditionally associated with an
increase in potentially life-threatening diarrheic illnesses."
"Over the past year, temporary breakdowns in the food distribution
system have resulted in a significant increase in malnutrition. In
Mornay [West Darfur], where 75,000 displaced people are housed, the
number of admissions for severe malnutrition in the MSF hospital rose
from 10 to 20 admissions per month from January to May 2005 and from
80 to 120 admissions per month from July to October [2005]. This
increase, which coincided with delays in food distributions to the
camps, is too great to be the result of seasonal fluctuation."
(Without Borders/ Médecins Sans Frontières, "latest operational
update," July 26, 2006)
MSF rightly highlights the continuing danger facing women gathering
firewood near camps (which, as the areas around the camps are
gradually stripped, requires more distant travel). SOAT also reported
in its "Human Rights Alert" of July 26, 2006:
"On 24 July 2006, approximately 25 armed militias, some in army
uniform, attacked twenty women outside Kalma internally displaced camp
in Nyala, South Darfur. The women were attacked whilst they were
collecting firewood. The women had gone outside the camp as a
collective in the false belief that they would be safe from attack as
a group."
"During the attack, the militias beat the women with the butt of their
guns and flogged them before raping seventeen of the women. The
details of the women raped are as follows, names withheld:
19 yrs, Fur tribe
19 yrs, Fur tribe, lives at sector 5
20 yrs, Fur tribe, lives at sector 4
22 yrs, Fur tribe
22 yrs, Fur tribe
22 yrs, Fur tribe, lives at sector 5
23 yrs, Fur tribe, lives at sector 5
24 yrs, Fur tribe, lives at sector 5
29 yrs, Fur tribe
30 yrs, Fur tribe, lives at sector 5
31 yrs, Fur tribe, lives at sector 5
32 yrs, Fur tribe, lives at sector 5
32 yrs, Fur tribe, lives at sector 5
32 yrs, Fur tribe, lives at sector 5
37 yrs, Fur tribe, lives at sector 5
40 yrs, Fur tribe, lives at sector 5
42 yrs, Fur tribe"
These women of course have names, and lives; most have families; all
have endured horrific physical and psychological trauma. These
rapes---and the tens of thousands of rapes that have preceded over the
past three years---are part of a systematic weapon of genocidal war
deployed by the Janjaweed and by Khartoum's regular military forces.
The women who are raped are often deliberately scarred or branded to
ensure their visual stigmatization; some have leg or ankle tendons cut
to hobble them. These attacks are deliberate assaults on familial and
social cohesion; they are intended to crush the morale of the non-Arab
or African tribal populations of Darfur, as fathers, husbands,
brothers, and sons are incapable of responding to these Janjaweed
assaults.
THE DARFUR PEACE AGREEEMENT
The Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) has collapsed with shocking rapidity.
No facile comments from the UN's Pronk, US officials, or other
international actors who pushed through this deeply flawed agreement
can change the brutal realities on the ground, and the rapid
deterioration in security. The African Union may have been funded
through October 1, 2006---perhaps even beyond---but it has lost all
credibility with the people of Darfur. It simply cannot function
meaningfully in providing security for civilians or humanitarians.
The Darfur Peace Agreement was from the beginning without meaningful
international guarantors of the security arrangements; the current
escalation of fighting could have been, and was, predicted. The
implementation of the various provisions of the DPA is failing because
Khartoum feels no meaningful international pressure, indeed is content
to abuse publicly the very notion of a UN peace support operation.
The International Criminal Court is held in similar contempt. The
large-scale military offensives in Jebel Moon and North Darfur are not
aberrations but deeply symptomatic of the National Islamic Front's
contempt for all agreements it makes with all Sudanese parties.
Indeed, the DPA has perversely come to serve as "justification" for
Khartoum's assaults on those who are not signatories.
Here it is instructive to look at comments made today by the
leadership of the southern Sudan People's Liberation Movement
regarding implementation of the north/south "Comprehensive Peace
Agreement" (January 9, 2006). Besides the failure to respect the key
findings of the Abyei Boundary Commission, or to move to establish
north-south boundaries in the oil regions, or to draw down its regular
military forces in Juba and surrounding garrisons, Khartoum continues
to support various militia forces in the south, particularly in the
oil regions of Upper Nile Province:
"Sudanese armed forces are still arming and supporting militias in
southern Sudan in violation of a peace deal which ended two decades of
a bloody civil war, a southern official said on Saturday. Under the
north-south peace deal signed in January 2005 all southern militias
were told to join the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) or the southern
Sudan People's Liberation Army, or lay down their arms. But hundreds
of people have been killed in continued clashes between militias in
the southeast Upper Nile region and the areas around Sudan's main oil
fields which are in the south."
"Pagan Amum, secretary-general of the former southern rebel Sudan
People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) which joined the coalition
government in Khartoum with the northern National Congress Party
[i.e., the National Islamic Front] under the 2005 peace deal, accused
the NCP of violating the peace deal. 'The continuation of support to
militias in the south from elements of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF)
is a violation of the peace agreement,' Amum told reporters in
Khartoum. 'It is known who is giving them arms, it is known who is
giving them money ... elements from SAF are continuing to arm them,'
Amum said." (Reuters [dateline: Khartoum], July 29, 2006
The existence of these militias, and Khartoum's continuing support for
them, is well known to all who will look honestly, though this
evidently does not include the UN's Pronk, who absurdly speaks of
"former South Sudan Defense Force commanders [ ] getting support from
what I have called [ ] on other occasions 'forces in the dark' in
Khartoum." (July 27, 2006 transcript of Jan Pronk press conference)
What does Pronk mean by his apparently reiterated phrase "forces in
the dark in Khartoum"? Does he mean to suggest that there are
consequential members of the National Islamic Front who are "in the
dark" (i.e., don't know what's occurring) with respect to payment and
support to the militias? Or does he mean to suggest that those
supporting the militias are on the "dark side" of a regime that
somehow has, elsewhere, enlightened members? Both readings are
absurd---contemptibly absurd. So, too, is Pronk's suggestion the
militia umbrella known as the South Sudan Defense Force (SSDF) is a
thing of the past: a number of senior SSDF commanders---most
notoriously Gordon Kong---still consider themselves SSDF commanders,
and are amply encouraged in so believing by various forms support and
payment from Khartoum.
The point here is not so much about Pronk's dismaying and destructive
incompetence as it is about the failure of Khartoum to honor the terms
of the CPA. Thus it matters little what may have been written into
the Darfur Peace Agreement: without credible international guarantees
and guarantors, the document is worthless and proves itself more so
every day. That the international community has no intention of
providing such guarantees and guarantors is also clearer by the day.
The current disintegration in Darfur that has left humanitarian
assistance "hanging by a thread" is accelerating, and the thread will
soon break entirely.
Eric Reeves
Smith College
Northampton, MA 01063
413-585-3326
ereeves@smith.edu
www.sudanreeves.org
