Where is the African Union in Darfur?

By Julie Flint
Commentary by
Wednesday, July 12, 2006

An attack on the North Darfur village of Bir Maza last weekend bore
all the hallmarks of the war the Sudanese government and the
Janjaweed militias have waged for the past three years against the
Darfur rebel movements and the civilians accused of supporting them:
a ground offensive by regular and militia forces, aerial support from
helicopter gunships, murder, and rape. But the government's partner
in crime in Bir Maza was not the Janjaweed. It was Khartoum's new
partner in peace - the faction of the rebel Sudan Liberation Army
(SLA) led by Minni Minawi.

With the conclusion of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) on May 5, the
conflict in Darfur has entered a phase even more cynical than that
which preceded it: The two signatories of the DPA, whom few
Darfurians trust, are attempting to force their "peace" on reluctant
civilians and in so doing to eliminate all opposition, armed and
otherwise, to their dominion.

Senior United Nations officials in Sudan are privately expressing
"great concern" about the government-Minawi alliance, which threatens
to be the end of the infant DPA and the beginning of a new war in
Darfur. But the African Union (AU), which sponsored the peace process
and whose troops are (in theory) keeping the peace in Darfur, has
said nothing - even though there is evidence that Khartoum disguised
one of its own helicopters as an AU chopper and used it to ferry
supplies into Bir Maza and to airlift its wounded out.

The AU's silence is eloquent testimony to the paralysis that has
afflicted it, under the wholly inadequate leadership of Baba Kingibe,
ever since the DPA was signed in Abuja. This silence will return to
haunt it. In Darfur today, an increasing number of people believe the
AU is taking sides - and, in their opinion, the wrong side. AU
leadership of the peace process, already seriously compromised by the
inadequacy of the process and the lack of support for the eventual
agreement, risks becoming untenable - indefensible, even. In the
short term, there is a danger of violence against AU police and staff
in the displaced camps where opposition to the DPA has been
manifested in demonstrations, riots and attacks on AU personnel. The
people of Darfur were not consulted over the agreement and were not
told what it offers them. Rightly or wrongly, they have no confidence
it will enable them to return in safety to their homes.

For the DPA to have had any chance of success, the AU had to move
ahead swiftly and decisively to implement it - both to control the
deteriorating security situation and to show those who were shut out
of Abuja that the agreement was more than a wish list. But nothing
has been done and no deadlines have been met.

Two examples stand out as potentially fatal to the hoped-for peace:
the failure late last month to organize a meeting at which the
government would have presented its plan for disarming the Janjaweed;
and the delay in appointing the head of the preparatory committee for
an all-Darfur conference without which peace is a pipedream.

Senior AU officials are threatening to resign, saying nothing can be
achieved while the current casual attitude persists. The mood among
those who care about Darfur - and there are many in the AU - is one
of total, genuine, unmitigated despair.

As a result of the AU's inaction - and the failure of the
international backers of the Abuja process to jolt the AU out of its
lethargy and incompetence - the carrot held out by the peace
agreement has been replaced by a vacuum. Into this vacuum have
stepped the Sudanese government and Minawi - both of whom believe in
domination by force; both of whom hope their signatures on the DPA
may afford them some protection from the International Criminal
Court, which is mandated by the UN Security Council to investigate
war crimes in Darfur.

http://www.dailystar.com.lb

The first punch of the new government-Minawi alliance came in the
first days of July and was directed not against armed opponents of
the DPA - but against civilians on the northeastern side of Jebel
Marra, the heartland of Minawi's SLA rival, Abdul Wahid Mohammad
al-Nur. Twenty-four civilians were killed in a single village, Sibi.
The AU said nothing.

The second punch, also against civilians, came a few days later on
the northern edge of Jebel Marra. Fifty civilians were killed in
attacks on a string of villages. The AU said nothing.

An attack on Fanga village in eastern Jebel Marra left another 25
civilians dead. Again the AU said nothing.

On July 8, the government-Minawi alliance attacked two villages that
are strongholds of commanders critical of Minawi and the peace
agreement, Bir Maza and Um Sidir. Eyewitnesses say the offensive was
carried out by ground forces supported by four helicopter gunships
and an Antonov bomber. A white helicopter marked "African Union
Mission to Sudan" provided logistical support. The AU assured the UN
that none of its helicopters participated in the attack on Bir Maza.
The UN urged the AU to issue a statement to this effect to prevent
further hemorrhage of support. The AU said nothing.

The people of Darfur have been regaled with long months of debate
over whether their tragedy amounts to genocide or merely (merely!)
war crimes. Dignitaries and celebrities have come and gone, consuming
vital AU man-hours. Now, because of AU inaction, the DPA is being
reduced to a defense pact between two abusive forces. Yet it was -
and is - the only glimmer of light on the horizon, no matter how
faint.

After so many mistakes, and so much inaction for so long, there is no
easy solution. More force - whether in the shape of a NATO force or
another foreign army - will only add fuel to the fire in Darfur. A UN
force to replace the present AU mission is rejected, with increasing
conviction, by the Sudanese government. Without a change of heart in
Khartoum, UN peacekeepers would have to fight their way into Darfur.
The lesson of Abuja is inescapable now: There is no quick fix, and no
lasting peace that is not both consensual and comprehensive.

With the conclusion of the Abuja talks, there is no political
process, no table around which Darfurians can sit to thrash out their
outstanding differences and seek to resolve them. Priority must be
given to creating a new forum - perhaps through the Darfur Joint
Commission, in which all parties to the conflict, including the
dissident rebel factions, are represented. The UN and the AU's Abuja
partners - the United States, the United Kingdom, Norway, France,
Italy and the Netherlands - must take the lead in planning for the
all-Darfur conference now. Building a consensus on the way forward
among all sectors of Darfurian society is too important to be left in
the lethargic hands of the African Union.

Julie Flint has written extensively on Sudan. She is the author, with
Alex de Waal, of "Darfur: A Short History of a Long War." She wrote
this commentary for THE DAILY STAR.

--- end forwarded text